RANGER AGAINST WAR <

Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Punch or Push?


All the wars that were won and lost
Somehow don't seem to matter

very much anymore

--Living on a Thin Line
, The Kinks

Strike against war, for without you

no battles can be fought

--Helen Keller


Ranger Thought on War Socialism:

Counterinsurgency is social security
provided to the world,
with no enrollment fees.
The American taxpayers fund this socialism,
but the war hawks never address that fact

___________________


Military strategist Heinz Guderian's Punch versus Push was recently mentioned in Ranger's piece, SOFISM. Though he is not a military historian like his friend Chief over @ Milpub, he will take the generalist's view of the idea.

The Mexican War will be our start, since that seems one of the best examples of the U.S.'s ability to fight a strategic war -- it was fought unilaterally and without alliance (unless one considers Texans, allies.)


Pre-war planning was conducted with corresponding troop movements, and the Army and Navy conducted deep objective, joint-service missions which destroyed the enemy's will to fight. The Mexican War was a successful demonstration of Guderian's "punch" imperative. Strangely, we related this war to relative obscurity in our pantheon, instead focusing upon our Civil War.


The U.S. Civil War is our Holy Grail, but one wonders why since this effort was largely pushing versus punching. The U.S. did not use the knock-out punch in it's own home-wrecking exercise.


The battles of General Lee were exceptional for their tactical maneuver, though he could not exploit his victories. He attempted to bring the fight to the enemy with deep penetrations, but he failed to achieve anything permanent with his Antietam victory.


Lee's successes at Seven Pines, Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg were simple pushing as the Union Army never lost its ability or will to continue the fight. Likewise, the Union victory at Gettysburg was meaningless because it lacked an exploitation phase.


The greatness of the Civil War was the emergence of Grant in the East because he fought and he exploited both his victories and his losses. He punched, and continued to do so while loosing General Sherman to strike deep into the enemy's rear for deep objectives. This was the true lesson of the CW, one which was used by Nazi military thinkers.


The Wehrmacht campaigns of note
were modeled upon this template of deep mobile warfare. These are principles of war: Seize the initiative and utilize economy of force. Bend the enemy to your will by destroying their will and ability to fight.

World War I was just a push fest, and so is inconsequential to this discussion.


World War II, however, was a strange brew of punch and push. The Pacific fight had the earmarks of punching by bypassing and attacking deep objectives. The expanses of the Pacific were analogous to the Germans fighting across the vast terrain of Russia. The German Army was like a vast Navy afloat in the sea of Russian battlefields.

The U.S. Army in Europe fought a pushing campaign that ignored the punching contest, but this was acceptable as it had a Russian sea drowning the Wehrmacht assets. The U.S. needed only to push and reinforce, pushing its way to victory.


The lessons of these wars were taught, and U.S. doctrine has always been to reach for deep objectives; however, we do not always attain this ideal.


In Korea the U.S. was restricted by a lack of maneuver space. (Afghanistan shares this attribute, but we are not facing organized armies there.) Somewhere along the way, the U.S. achieved a disconnect in its military doctrine. Was this due to our nuclear dominance, or just misguided thought?


In Vietnam, the U.S. reactively pushed an enemy that seldom relinquished the initiative. He never fought unless it was to his advantage to do so. Often he would fight even though he sustained a tactical defeat, if it facilitated his strategic goals. The U.S. has violated the principles of war, and still fails to acknowledge that fact.

Gulf War I was a live fire field training exercise. The Phony War on Terror (
PWOT ©) has the U.S. roaming the Third World releasing violence and raining death from the sky with no observable tactical or strategic value to be had. We are General Lee killing for the sake of killing sans any chance of destroying the enemy's will to fight -- in fact, emboldening it. We cannot even define who the enemy is on any given day.

Like Lee, in Iraq we were unable to convert a tactical victory -- which the invasion was -- into a strategic defeat of terrorism. We are punching and pushing air. How can the greatest superpower the world has seen devolve into such a primitive mentality? The only conclusion we can reach is that our violence is as symbolic as that of any terrorist group, and as meaningless.


Both the violence of the terrorist and ours is mindless, and illustrative of impotence.

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Thursday, August 04, 2011

A Static Display of Impotence


--Dollar Operation, Arend van Dam

How can I bear unaided the trouble of you,

and the burden, and the bickering!

--Deuteronomy 1:12


And the Governors agree to say:

"He's a lovely man!"
He makes it easier for

Them to screw

All of you...

Yes, that's true!

--Heavenly Bank Account, Frank Zappa


There can be economy
only where there is efficiency
--Benjamin Disraeli
___________________


The recent debt ceiling debate and budget cut proposals led Ranger to think about the Principles of War and how they were violated in the last several weeks (The Nine Principles can be viewed HERE.) The Principles are the foundation for planning and executing a successful military exercise, and the rules are readily applicable to ensure the success of most undertakings.

Ticking off the list:

MASS:
This fight could not place the combat power at the decisive place and time; it was an exercise in futility. The decisive battle should not be about caps and cuts but rather, how do we stem the economic assault on our defensive position? We are re-acting when we should be acting. The entire debt limit discussion was an admission of defeat.

OBJECTIVE:
There was not a clearly-defined, decisive or attainable objective. Just as with the present U.S. Counterinsurgency (COIN) policy, the negotiation gave more credence to politics than to attainable objectives. The objective was not reached because it was obscured by smoke.

OFFENSIVE:
Neither political party maintained or achieved the initiative.

SURPRISE:
Both parties put all their assets forward, leaving them with nothing in reserve (which also affected their maneuver plan.)

ECONOMY OF FORCE:
Ditto above regarding surprise. Additionally secondary efforts were ignored and never prioritized. Not discussed were balance of trade, loss of jobs, balance of dollars leaving our shores, loss of industry and weak economic white papers. Nope -- we just focused on borrowing more, slashing and burning more.

MANEUVER
:
Both sides were totally dug-in defending in zone with no demonstrable mobile warfare. Neither side possessed the combat power essential to overrun the opposing side. It was a static display of impotence.

UNITY OF COMMAND:
One would assume the President would be the responsible commander, but this oversimplifies the situation. Obama should have stated his commander's guidance, but allowed the maneuver commanders to formulate their respective Operations orders. By placing himself on the battlefield he ignored the subordinate chain of command. In addition, his presence stiffened the opposition to an unacceptable intransigence.


SECURITY:
There can be no unexpected advantages in this altercation because we had already lost our freedom of movement and would win or lose with the forces committed. This hardly describes the concept of security.

SIMPLICITY:
Simplicity was violated because the principle of objective was ignored. The leaders preferred to ignore this principle to the detriment of the goals of the operation.

In a recent Time essay, "How Today's Conservatism Lost Touch with Reality
," Fareed Zakaria bemoans the intransigence of today's conservatives, saying they have lost their touchstone of "reality" in exchange for reactive policies which ignore the truths on the ground. For instance, they failed to recognize that, "(t)axes — federal and state combined — as a percentage of GDP are at their lowest level since 1950":

"The U.S. is among the lowest taxed of the big industrial economies. So the case that America is grinding to a halt because of high taxation is not based on facts but is simply a theoretical assertion. The rich countries that are in the best shape right now, with strong growth and low unemployment, are ones like Germany and Denmark, neither one characterized by low taxes."

So the can has been kicked down the road; Ranger hasn't any faith that the next group of mutton-heads will apply the simple and infallible Principles to their effort.

Everyone says they love the military, yet they cannot apply some simple procedures to their policy-making processes.


[cross-posted @ milpub]

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Monday, December 21, 2009

Goat Ropin'


What the fuck is there for us in Afghanistan
except goats and the men who love them?

--Gordon, at
Alternate Brain

Mares eat oats and does eat oats,

and little lambs eat ivy;

a kid’ll eat ivy too, wouldn’t you?

--Mairzy Dotes
, Drake/Hoffman/Livingston
______________

The new bill of goods being sold to the U.S. taxpaying bots is the Strategy Change in this, the United States of the Phony War on Terror (USPWOT ©).

Yes, we know it's morphed from a GWOT, TWOT or a WOT. However, the strategies underpinning the continued wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to be based upon GWOT strategic thinking, or what passes for strategic thinking (see seydlitz89's deconstruction of Gian Gentile's position paper on this matter at MilPub)
, so the outcome will not be different.

The reasoning supporting the PWOT © is faulty and violates the Principles of War. The new strategy, like the old, is doomed to military, political and economic failure because it ignores the basic principles.
Simply: Any military or political endeavor that expends precious U.S. assets must pay off with a quantifiable dividend for our nation (not theirs). One does not fight for emotional, feel-good slogans.

Warfare is based upon rules and reality. The reality is survival, dominance, and the subjection of rivals. Even the Bible supports this approach.
Fighting has a social and military aspect. Military operations affect social development, so what are we doing in Afghanistan? We don't want to steal their women, and it's not for the goats.

The principles of war evolved from primitive intelligence and are as applicable today as they were at the time of their development. Forget 4GW and asymmetrical warfare and all the other cute new terms.
War has always been asymmetrical and the principles remain the same, whether one's goal is to steal women, goats, horses or countries. Wars are not fought to destroy countries, but rather to convert assets to your benefit.

Two of the main principles the U.S. is violating -- whether one views the wars as counterinsurgency or conventional warfare -- are failing to define the MISSION and OBJECTIVE. What are the benefits
to us in our current theatres? Furthermore, what is the validity and purpose of our worldwide troop deployments?

It is clear that NATO is OBE, and that the European Union has no viable external enemies which threaten them on any level. It is laughable to claim the Taliban as a threat to NATO; ditto, Iran.


The U.S. is not the world's savior. Let's accept this comedown from our messiah complex, and allow other nations the luxury of expending their own money to protect their interests,
a job not in the prospectus of the U.S. taxpayer.

Let Europe, Japan and Korea carry their own weight by expending their resources and getting out from under the U.S. funding/troop umbrella. While this approach may have been valid in 1950, it is no longer realistic or palatable in 2009.


It is hypocritical to ask Russia, North Korea and Iran to pull in their horns when we are unwilling to do the same.

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Monday, November 09, 2009

Principles of War


Don't throw the past away
You might need it some rainy day
Dreams can come true again
When everything old is new again

--Everything Old is New Again,

Peter Allen

_________________

Ranger submitted an entry to a contest held by the The U.S. Naval Institute's journal
Proceedings several years back on the topic of warfare -- "Rethinking the Future Nature of Conflict". Needless to say, his neanderthal, non-4 GW thinking merited not so much as a nod.

But hearing Tyler Boudreau, former-Marine Captain and author of "Packing Inferno," address the topic of mission on National Public Radio this weekend got us thinking once again about mission and so-called New Nature of War. Simply: Everything is exactly the same as it was pre-9-11-01. No change. Nada.


The Constitution and the Rules of War are exactly as relevant and correct as they have always been. Clausewitz is alive and well. Even Sun-Tzu is still kicking! Asymmetrical warfare my ass. That's the way it has always been, just with new toys, now.


The Principles of War, as defined in the Army FM-3 Military Operations, were taught in 3rd-year ROTC class, so basic that all officers should be able to recite them in their sleep. Since our military leaders seem in a deep slumber, this is probably the only time they ponder the verity of these nine guiding principles. (If the reader doubts this, ask any officer to tick these off. Ranger will buy you a beer if you get a complete and correct answer.)


To a military man, these nine are more important than the 10 Commandments. They are:


  • Mass
  • Objective
  • Offensive
  • Surprise
  • Economy of Force
  • Maneuver
  • Unity of Command
  • Security
  • Simplicity

The principles apply to classic military operations, of which counterinsurgency is anything but. We try to operate as COIN, yet apply conventional combat power to the situation in a most inappropriate manner. Following classic Clausewitzian philosophy, this will ensure that COIN will fail.

COIN is not warfare, and therein lies the rub.
Classic combat operations insure the defeat of COIN theory and practice. Our political and military leaders have futilely been trying to fit COIN into a war formula, and trying to accommodate the war formula to fit COIN. The Principles of War are being ignored in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©), though we carry on as though at war.

We have lost our way.
The only things being advanced are careers on the backs of the taxpayers and dead and wounded soldiers. All in a war that isn't a war, and a COIN experiment that isn't COIN.

If a Captain of USMC Infantry can see this, then why can't the Chiefs of Staff of the Services?

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