Dear Ranger, Redux

Gray skies are gonna clear up,
Put on a happy face;
Brush off the clouds and cheer up,
Put on a happy face
--Put on a Happy Face,
Bye, Bye Birdie

________________

[Re-post, from 18 May 2009. Ranger will soon re-visit another battle analysis, recently vindicated six years later after new "technology" was released.]

Ranger recently received a lengthy letter from a serviceman in response to recent Wanat articles, mostly echoing the institutional party line, while agreeing with Ranger on a point or two. In the name of anonymity, we will call him "Paul".

Paul specifically agreed with Ranger that he did not care about Iraq or Afghanistan, and yet he felt it was imperative that the U.S. "win the war" and go whole hog with counterinsurgency (CI).

Unfortunately, this misses the entire point of CI: You cannot say you want to win a COIN operation, because the only people who would win would be the indigenous, and you have stated you do not care about them. You then come around to my position: The war is a lie. It is not about COIN, it is about us.

The two possible missions are non-parallel -- there is the "Win" mission (for oil, or whatever it is we win), or the COIN mission. It is disingenuous to claim for both.

Though Paul seemed upset that Ranger was engaging in "armchair quarterbacking," four typed pages of letter belied his same concerns. He wrote --

"Security is high on the hierarchy of needs. These Combat Outposts (COPs) are typically co-located with local national COPs and are eventually turned over to local forces when an area is deemed secure enough. Loyalty to the government, local, provincial, or otherwise, is complex at times because of tribal and religious affiliations, but generally occurs when an area is secure enough for the government to meet and function effectively. This was proven in the “restive” Diyala Province, Iraq. "Prior to Feb 2008, no legislation could be passed because there was no quorum in the Provincial Counsel (Baqubah, the former capital of the “Islamic State of Iraq,” was not safe for the Counsel members. Since then, the counsel has executed about ½ of 3 annual budgets and they did it inside of a 9 month period. At this point, it’s probably all been committed and work, real capacity building work that improves people’s lives, is now underway. It is worth noting that we, in the US, struggle with executing 1 year’s worth of budget most years… without the threat of car bombs and assassination."

Only time will tell if this is true. Even if it does play out, what benefit has accrued to the U.S. taxpayer who shouldered this burden? Improving lives in Baghdad is not purpose or reason for the existence of the U.S. Army. This is an Iraqi concern.

If improving lives is a U.S. military mission, then let them work their magic in Cleveland or Detroit.

He said, "While the locals are no doubt not happy with a US presence in their neighborhood, they’re likely no more or less thrilled with the Taliban or Al Qaeda, either," but where is the proof of an al-Qaeda presence in Wanat?

"TOWs would be attached to deal with VBIEDs, as insurgents have been known to “Up Armor” them, dump trucks in particular, and then drive at speed into friendly formations causing a lot of damage and casualties. 50 CALs have failed to stop a fair number of these in the past. Further, many of the areas that what we would formerly have called “the Mujahedeen” occupied in the mountains during their late unpleasantness with the Soviets were fortified with concrete and construction equipment provided by none other than Osama Bin Laden and his family’s construction company (…this was a major contribution of his to the war effort…). That reason, coupled with tasks such as clearing caves, are two more possible reasons for having this capability along."

What was the maximum range for the TOW employment at Wanat? Would AT4's served defensively for this position? Couldn't the engineers crater the road for protection, if necessary? Since no overlays or topo maps are available, what were the high-speed avenues of approach into the village?

Since the mission was initially defensive, it is doubtful that the Combat Outpost would be attacked by a cave. This leaves up-armored VBIED's, which aren't exactly tactical vehicles. If a .50 cal with Ap and API will not stop them, then why not employ AT4's?

Also, what about mortars to stop vehicles? This is a standard mortar technique. Where were these vehicles parked, and were they arrayed tactically?

He mentions the 24 attached Afghan troops: Was the Afghan element under the command and control of the Platoon leader, or were they in a separate chain of command? What was the rank of the two USMC advisers, and why have we not heard any comments from these individuals?

Of the 24 Afghan paratroopers he says,

"I’d suggest one likely possibility is that they didn’t patrol. I think that this may be a function of uneasiness with their situation in terms of force protection, as you seem to indicate, but also because of a desire to keep their combat power massed together. This would have allowed them to finish their work on the foothold they were clearly seeking to establish in relative security, with operations beginning in earnest after the site was completed. I’m not saying this is what happened, I’m saying this is a possibility based on the fact that counterinsurgency is a slow growth enterprise and that leadership was probably taking a longer view of their operation… for better or for worse."

This indicates that Brigade and Battalion did not have a thorough, well thought out plan. If they did, more assets would have been assigned during the key period of establishing a perimeter defense. He is confusing COIN with conventional Platoon in the defense doctrine; the two are not the same.

Finally, Paul says, "[Y]ou seem as though you’re treating the men and women who actually fight this war like they are idiots… they are most certainly not that." Ranger thinks all the fights he has commented on were idiotic. Any Platoon Leader executing suicidal orders and losing nine men KIA is not a brain surgeon.

The upshot is, the U.S. will abandon the Aghanis and Iraqis that have fought on our side now as readily as we did our Vietnamese Montagnard allies in the Vietnam war.

Though you say, "America practically invented modern insurgency/counterinsurgency warfare," we left their hearts and minds behind when we hooked up.

My War

--h/t Deryle

"Quit smiling. What are you smiling for?
This is an arrest." This is your mug shot,
not your prom photo. I was smiling from happiness;
my government will not disappear me
--Peace Demonstration
Maxine Hong Kingston

Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it
--George Santayana

Lt. Stanley McChrystal enters an army in the late 70's
that is broken, riddled with drugs and race problems.
The soldiers aren't very good:
a collection of drunks, dirtbags,
junkies and scammers.
--The Operators, Michael Hastings (171)
___________________

Ranger has noticed a dismissive attitude toward the United States Army that fought in Vietnam, particularly at the Bad Boy lad's sites. He is not sure the reason for the snitty attitudes, but it seems like the lads doth protest too much. Their attitude ranges from supercilious to dismissive, implying that the U.S. experience in Vietnam is passe, and today's ranks are far superior in technology, doctrine, etc.

This arrogance of dismissing the recent past as Old School and no longer relevant is short-sighted and dangerous. Wars are not fought ex nihilo, and that certainly holds for today's supposed efforts at Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counterterrorism (CT).

Today's military can focus on Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) and pretend that it is a real war, when it is actually (fill in the blank.) In fact, today's Army has slack that we did not have in the 1960's and 70's, despite the rhetoric of how the last decade's stress has been so professionally addressed.

The U.S. fought a war in the Republic of Vietnam while also being deployed to address the Warsaw Pact. My service in Vietnam was preceded by a line Infantry assignment facing this threat on the German border -- these were real threats. Today, the U.S. faces no such opponent.

As for combat ability, today's Army (USMC) has not fought any battles against hardcore enemy Battalions, Regiments or Divisions. The RVN battles against enemy units with organic artillery and severe unit discipline are legend. Enemy supply columns actually rolled down the Ho Chi Minh Trail like rush hour traffic in downtown Baghdad. The enemy had the "division slice" of support for their operations, to include timely and accurate intelligence on U.S. intentions and capabilities.

The enemy in Vietnam had the will, the capability and the intent to prepare the battlefield at higher echelons, something unheard of in the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©). The threat faced in Vietnam was real and vicious ... what equivalent did we see after the fall of Baghdad or the months following the invasion of Afghanistan? The Taliban has no Regimental or above combat capabilities.

Per U.S. forces, we had one echelon above Corps, meaning we had a real Theatre Army scenario, to include a Theatre Army Commander with Corps supporting. This means not only did we have Theatre - Corps - Division assets, but we also had the on-call abilities of the RVN forces including all of the usual suspects: Artillery, Aviation, Combat Support and Combat Service Support. We operated as an Army, not as door-kicking combat Brigades sans higher assets.

So what's the reason for the dismissive attitude toward my Army as being anything less than professional? Where is the evidence that any draftee fought less professionally than did the forces in the PWOT? From whence this lack of fraternity?

The troops in the Vietnam War were largely draftees and they earned their battle streamers with the same valor as did troops in all previous U.S. wars. What battles in Afghanistan or Iraq demonstrated the level of violence experienced by the Infantry units in the Vietnam War?

Further, there is a logical fallacy built into the argument of the Old Army detractors who say the 60's and 70's Army was "amateurish". If that is so, then we must accept that the Warsaw Pact was neutralized by a bunch of quacks. The next illogical step is to believe that today's professional volunteer force is totally responsible for the defeat of al Qaeda, despite the fact that less than 200 al Qaeda operatives exist worldwide (per former Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta.)

Framing the argument qua the Andrew Exum crowd, a crowd of amateurs defended the U.S. against Warsaw Pact with thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and millions of soldiers, while we are now ably protected against a laughable threat by the New Warriors.

Taking their argument to its logical ends, one must also believe the military leadership during the 60's was also incompetent, though carrying experience from two wars before assuming leadership in Vietnam. Contrast that with the present day Professional Army which sports a dearth of combat experience at the highest levels. The depth of experience was greater in Ranger's time frame than it is today, contrary to the hype.

And this is why we need poppy eradication programs in Afghanistan (though the Bushmills tap will always flow.)

365 Bottles of Beer

--Preparing for a day on the town?

Manliness is not all swagger and mountain climbing.
It's also tenderness
--Tea and Sympathy (1956)

There is only one way to win hearts
and that is to make oneself
like unto those of whom one would be loved
--The Painted Veil, Somerset Maugham

We haven't had any tea for a week...
The bottom is out of the Universe!
--Rudyard Kipling

Day will break and I'll wake
And start to bake a sugar cake
For you to take for all the boys to see
--Tea for Two, No, No Nanette
__________________

[The 1st of 2 parts]

As an older man, it is hard to look back upon the absurdities of one's life, even harder looking back at the absurdities of one's professional life, which happened to correspond to those of the nation.

Ranger's young manhood was devoted to the U.S. Army, an institution which owned his body if not mind, and he was fine with this since his goal was to be an unconventional warfare specialist.

Since that time the U.S. has fought many unconventional / guerrilla warfare (UW/GW) type scenarios. Most are unfamiliar to the average citizen, who relies on an increasingly entertainment based media for information. That media determines that fictions like "Three Cups of Tea" are more palatable depictions of what counterinsurgency means -- COIN-as-teatime. It's simply a matter of getting them to see we are all on this ball of dirt together and that we all want the same things. Except when we don't.

Fiction is fine when you're enjoying a nice, bold beaujolais and Salad Nicoise at the book club. The problem enters when everyone from General Petraeus down to the youngest rifleman based their assumptions and their beliefs in their actions upon such faulty premises. Somehow, the Army came to believe that drinking tea with locals was the tipping point that would win hearts and minds. (Oh, yeah -- tea and a lot of moolah.) The Gods of War and the locals must be laughing themselves silly.

Ranger has not been involved in Afghanistan, but can share his ancient history with COIN and UW/GW while a young Infantry branch officer in Vietnam serving with the 5th Special Forces on his Southeast Asia holiday rampage.

Stepping off the aircraft at Ton Son Nhut airport, I was as naive as a young soldier could be. I was also as well-trained as any Infantryman that ever deployed under the battle flags of the U.S. Army. Not just Ranger-qualified but Special Forces Officer-qualified after serving in a line Infantry Division. Back then, young officers were given four months of troop duty before being sent to the Big Show, which Ranger later learned was the SE Asian version of Disneyland for soldiers.

Like every other soldier, whether draftee or enlisted, he was fully prepared to do whatever my Army required to win the war. Every last one of us were willing to kill or be killed in the process of doing what our country required of us, but therein lies the crux of the biscuit: What was required?

When I stepped off that airplane wearing jump boots, crossed rifles, junior jump wings and a Ranger tab with a Green Beret on my high and tight head, I had absolutely no idea what I was doing on the ramp of that airplane, stepping into a war that almost everyone knew was lost (it was 1970). What I did possess was every infantry skill required to kill people, be it on an organizational or personal level.

After I stepped off that plane, 18,000 soldiers died for a policy that was as dead as an old man's dick, but we soldiered on because that is what soldiers do. We are not quitters.


[Tomorrow: 365 Bottles, Part 2]

Time Warp

You're there in the time slip
And nothing can ever be the same
You're spaced out on sensation,
like you're under sedation
--Time Warp,
Rocky Horror Picture Show

Those who can make you believe absurdities
can make you commit atrocities
--Voltaire
________________

There is an unwritten rule among competent soldiers that says, never criticize your contemporaries. This is both self-serving and prudent, as have all done something that can be seen as deficient.

So what did McChrystal's unidentified aide mean when he criticized General George Jones as being "a clown" who was "stuck in 1985" (The Runaway General)?

Presumably the criticism meant that Jones was still a proponent of Cold War methods and ideology [1985 was the year Jones entered the War College, while McChrystal took command of the 75th Ranger Regiment.] The implication is that Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counter Terrorism have superseded the Cold War mindset.

However, the Cold War mentality is still alive and well in U.S. foreign and military policy. From Colin Powell to Condi Rice to Hillary Clinton, we are still playing the containment game with Russia. Even after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the U.S. still aims to isolate Russia, thereby curtailing her efforts at military expansion.

The problem with this approach is that Russia shows little desire to engage in military adventurism. That is instead a role the U.S. occupies in today's world arena.

Our military forces are addressing a Warsaw Pact that no longer exists. So while the comment of McChrystal's henchman was true, there is an odd and disingenuous ideological grafting which is prevalent in the COIN crowd: They justify the continuation of the war in Afghanistan using Cold War logic, and the same language which justified the U.S. occupation of Korea for 60 years.

They speak of The Long War with glee, but to use Korea as justification is an absurd position. The North Koreans are a tad more of a threat than are the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which total probably less than 200.

The bold Coindinistas are, like the General they dismiss, caught in a Cold War time warp; they just don't know it. It made more sense back when Communism was they bogeyman; at least then it was nation-states against each other. Now, it is a nation-state opposing less than 1,000 people.

The COIN proponents are too stoked to see what an ideologically odd gryphon to which they pay homage.

________________

Scrum

--Den of Vipers, Arend van Dam

_______________

George Will's description of General Petraeus's approach to counterinsurgency as the "civilianization of the military" has been getting some play the past few days.

"Petraeus wanted to know: Why had the Shiite finance minister closed the bank? How quickly could the local manager reopen it? How many guards did the bank need and what was the plan to train them?

"This is not the militarization of U.S. policy. Rather, it is the civilianization of the military, an inevitable consequence of nation-building (The Military Tries Nation-Building in Afghanistan)."

But this is not a good deconstruction of FM 3-24, co-authored by Petraeus. If either Will or Petraeus went by that manual, they would understand that the military has inappropriately usurped functions rightfully belonging to the State Department.

COIN is not a unilateral military mission, nor should we civilialinize the military. It should not be played like a game of scrabble, in which the tiles are shuffled and rearranged endlessly. Furthermore, a greater concern is that we have militarized the civilian agencies such as the State Department. When former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice introduced the concept of "Clear-hold-build" in 2005, she was muddling the agencies' missions.

COIN should be a synergistic interplay between State and Defense, but its execution has instead morphed into a miasma that nobody seems to understand -- not Will, Petraeus, Obama or Secretary of State Clinton.

A well-oiled machine with discrete and integral parts this is not.

Tell Them Valdez is Coming

I can't escape the uneasy feeling that
we're fighting, and escalating, the last war
-- while the enemy fights the next one
--Eugene Robinson, Bigger System Failure

Endeavor to persevere
--Outlaw Josey Wales (1967)
_________________

Ranger recently commented to some disdain at blog MilPub that the U.S. has already lost the next real war that we will have to fight.

Counterinsurgency has taught us how to lose wars while rationalizing these losses as victories. The U.S. has embraced fighting phony wars that can be lost with impunity to such an extent that we have forgotten how to win real wars. Today: Yemen, anyone? (How to Fight al-Qaeda's Offshoot in Yemen; Lawmakers Focus on Yemen.)

The following is a COIN Leadership exercise -- a mirror and a Class A uniform are required. This is self-administered and can be conducted at any pace. for the young soldiers reading this text.


[1] Dress up in Class A uniform with all applicable awards, tabs and decorations.

[2] Stand in front of mirror. Be at ease.

[3] Breathe deeply while placing one hand on the Soldier's Creed and one over the Ranger's Creed.

[4] Look earnestly in the mirror and reflect upon your glory while reciting:

"I am a soldier of the United States of America."

"I am a member of an Army that hasn't lost a battle since 1950, but hasn't won a war since 1945."

"None of these fine awards will change that fact."

Now you are dismissed and may proceed to the nearest bar to have a patriotic American buy you a free drink.

**Warning: If this procedural is conducted with Dress Blues, caution is advised in the case of erections lasting more than four hours. Proceed directly to the nearest emergency room in the case of this unfortunate eventuality.

Rube Goldberg's COIN

Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent
a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves
--Eric Hoffer

[Clear guidance] and unity
is not only logical but indeed indispensable
in a successful military organization,
but in a democracy debate is the breath of life
--President Eisenhower

"To the Taliban, winning is, in fact, not losing,"
he said.
"They feel that over time, they will ultimately outlast
the international community's attempt to
stabilize Afghanistan. It's really a game of will to them."
--Taliban Surprising U.S. Forces

__________________

The September/October Columbia Journalism Review's cover story -- "Too Close for Comfort?" -- questions the impartiality of reporter Tom Ricks' recent coverage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggesting Ricks has become a cheerleader for wars he once roundly criticized. And Ricks is not the only former critic-turned-supporter.

Ricks is the author of 2006's Fiasco, which savaged George Bush's war efforts as being ill-conceived and poorly executed with neither clearly stated plans nor goals. However, since 2007 Ricks has affiliated himself with the Washington D.C. think tank Center for a New American Security where he has an office, and he is now a champion of current U.S. counterinsurgency [COIN] efforts.

Ricks attributes what he is now lauding as the successes in Iraq and AFPAK to "dissidents" like General Petraeus, but a dissident never did wear 4 Stars on his uniform. A 4 Star is a playa.

Ranger wonders why he doesn't cash-in on COIN, cheerleading for phony wars and faulty COIN doctrine. The fetti must be good.

Tom Ricks is too good of a journalist not to know the basic flaws with COIN policy, some of which have been delineated by former COIN advocate Col. Gian P. Gentile, a man now on Rick's hit list. Some of the fallacies accepted as bedrock strengths are:

• ♥'s and Minds: It is erroneous to believe that either Afghan or Iraqi hearts and minds will be won by a foreign, Christian-based Western Army of Occupation. If any hearts and minds are won, they probably belong to the pimps and whores who are selling. What is the proof of hearts and minds won?

• Low Intensity Conflict [LIC] and Terrorism as existential threats to the welfare of the United States: While these are viewed as central to U.S. Defense Policy, there is no proof that we are, as the Review states, "[in] an age in which global terrorism and small-scale conflicts, rather than a cold-war enemy like the former Soviet Union, define the threats to the United States."
  

Defense policy should be based upon reality versus ambiguous, poorly understood and often overblown threats. Neither AFPAK nor Iraq will ever be key U.S. allies, nor do they contribute to the welfare of the U.S. -- they are money pits and albatrosses attached to our body politic. COIN sounds good, but how does the American taxpayer footing the bill benefit from LIC/CT in AFPAK and Iraq?

The security of the U.S. is a different creature than the security of these far-flung nations. Threats to Karzai and the Iraqi leaders are not threats to the U.S. These people are not allies -- they are U.S. inventions.

LIC and CT are not threats, though they are interpreted as such by a military and political class desperate to justify their existence and place at the public money trough. Terrorism is the threat.

• General Petraeus and followers emphasize "protecting the local population, rather than going after the insurgents," but what do you do when the insurgents are the population?

COIN has U.S. soldiers fighting and dying for foreign governments when there is no logical imperative for their sacrifice. COIN is an emotional construct, like "hope".

• In addition, no one explains how the insurgents in AFPAK and Iraq are a threat to the welfare of the U.S. An insurgent threat to these nations is not necessarily a threat to America. Insurgents are not always terrorists, and vice versa.

• Why does the U.S. have a right or obligation to impose its will upon failed or failing states.

U.S forces are placed in a position of fighting for foreign governments when there is no logical imperative for their sacrifice. We win neither hearts and minds nor allies, and only an idiot would believe these countries would come to the aid of the U.S. in a pinch. When our dollars die, so too will their love and devotion. Allies are not pimps, nor are pimps allies.

The weakness of COIN is that it is a top-down imposition, while the insurgents are building a bottom-up approach to opposing a foreign-controlled puppet regime. COIN cannot succeed in impoverished environments where concepts of democracy are not explainable to a tribal existence-level society.

Democracy demands an educated middle class, something which has fled Iraq and is in short supply in Afghanistan. Democracy cannot be intubated. Just because COIN makes for pretty words in a manual does not make it realistic or achievable.

Bottom line: It matters not who controls Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan -- the only thing that matters is that they not export terrorism, and COIN will not ensure that. The threat not CT, LIC or any other acronym -- the threat is terrorism.

The entire Phony War on Terror (PWOT©) is based upon a hyperbolic global threat. The real threat is failed nations and power vacuums thus created, and U.S. policy in isolation cannot solve the problem via fancy manuals and COIN policy.

The problem must be confronted via multi-national United Nations action. COIN is simply an extension of U.S. exceptionalism and unilateralism, and as such is DOA.

Dear Ranger

Gray skies are gonna clear up,
Put on a happy face;
Brush off the clouds and cheer up,
Put on a happy face
--Put on a Happy Face, Bye, Bye Birdie
________________

Ranger recently received a lengthy letter from a serviceman in response to recent Wanat articles, mostly echoing the institutional party line, while agreeing with Ranger on a point or two. In the name of anonymity, we will call him "Paul".

Paul specifically agreed with Ranger that he did not care about Iraq or Afghanistan, and yet he felt it was imperative that the U.S. "win the war" and go whole hog with counterinsurgency (CI).

Unfortunately, this misses the entire point of CI: You cannot say you want to win a COIN operation, because the only people who would win would be the indigenous, and you have stated you do not care about them. You then come around to my position: The war is a lie. It is not about COIN, it is about us.

The two possible missions are non-parallel -- there is the "Win" mission (for oil, or whatever it is we win), or the COIN mission. It is disingenuous to claim for both.

Though Paul seemed upset that Ranger was engaging in "armchair quarterbacking," four typed pages of letter belied his same concerns. He wrote --

"Security is high on the hierarchy of needs. These Combat Outposts (COPs) are typically co-located with local national COPs and are eventually turned over to local forces when an area is deemed secure enough. Loyalty to the government, local, provincial, or otherwise, is complex at times because of tribal and religious affiliations, but generally occurs when an area is secure enough for the government to meet and function effectively. This was proven in the “restive” Diyala Province, Iraq. "Prior to Feb 2008, no legislation could be passed because there was no quorum in the Provincial Counsel (Baqubah, the former capital of the “Islamic State of Iraq,” was not safe for the Counsel members. Since then, the counsel has executed about ½ of 3 annual budgets and they did it inside of a 9 month period. At this point, it’s probably all been committed and work, real capacity building work that improves people’s lives, is now underway. It is worth noting that we, in the US, struggle with executing 1 year’s worth of budget most years… without the threat of car bombs and assassination."

Only time will tell if this is true. Even if it does play out, what benefit has accrued to the U.S. taxpayer who shouldered this burden? Improving lives in Baghdad is not purpose or reason for the existence of the U.S. Army. This is an Iraqi concern.

If improving lives is a U.S. military mission, then let them work their magic in Cleveland or Detroit.

He said, "While the locals are no doubt not happy with a US presence in their neighborhood, they’re likely no more or less thrilled with the Taliban or Al Qaeda, either," but where is the proof of an al-Qaeda presence in Wanat?

"TOWs would be attached to deal with VBIEDs, as insurgents have been known to “Up Armor” them, dump trucks in particular, and then drive at speed into friendly formations causing a lot of damage and casualties. 50 CALs have failed to stop a fair number of these in the past. Further, many of the areas that what we would formerly have called “the Mujahedeen” occupied in the mountains during their late unpleasantness with the Soviets were fortified with concrete and construction equipment provided by none other than Osama Bin Laden and his family’s construction company (…this was a major contribution of his to the war effort…). That reason, coupled with tasks such as clearing caves, are two more possible reasons for having this capability along."

What was the maximum range for the TOW employment at Wanat? Would AT4's served defensively for this position? Couldn't the engineers crater the road for protection, if necessary? Since no overlays or topo maps are available, what were the high-speed avenues of approach into the village?

Since the mission was initially defensive, it is doubtful that the Combat Outpost would be attacked by a cave. This leaves up-armored VBIED's, which aren't exactly tactical vehicles. If a .50 cal with Ap and API will not stop them, then why not employ AT4's?

Also, what about mortars to stop vehicles? This is a standard mortar technique. Where were these vehicles parked, and were they arrayed tactically?

He mentions the 24 attached Afghan troops: Was the Afghan element under the command and control of the Platoon leader, or were they in a separate chain of command? What was the rank of the two USMC advisers, and why have we not heard any comments from these individuals?

Of the 24 Afghan paratroopers he says,

"I’d suggest one likely possibility is that they didn’t patrol. I think that this may be a function of uneasiness with their situation in terms of force protection, as you seem to indicate, but also because of a desire to keep their combat power massed together. This would have allowed them to finish their work on the foothold they were clearly seeking to establish in relative security, with operations beginning in earnest after the site was completed. I’m not saying this is what happened, I’m saying this is a possibility based on the fact that counterinsurgency is a slow growth enterprise and that leadership was probably taking a longer view of their operation… for better or for worse."

This indicates that Brigade and Battalion did not have a thorough, well thought out plan. If they did, more assets would have been assigned during the key period of establishing a perimeter defense. He is confusing COIN with conventional Platoon in the defense doctrine; the two are not the same.

Finally, Paul says, "[Y]ou seem as though you’re treating the men and women who actually fight this war like they are idiots… they are most certainly not that." Ranger thinks all the fights he has commented on were idiotic. Any Platoon Leader executing suicidal orders and losing nine men KIA is not a brain surgeon.

The upshot is, the U.S. will abandon the Aghanis and Iraqis that have fought on our side now as readily as we did our Vietnamese Montagnard allies in the Vietnam war. Though you say, "America practically invented modern insurgency/counterinsurgency warfare," we left their hearts and minds behind when we hooked up.

Search and Avoid

They call it stormy Monday,
but Tuesday's just as bad
Wednesday's worse,
and Thursday's also sad
--Stormy Monday, T-Bone Walker

________________

Global Post's Matt Steinglass wrote a two-part article last month on the "Lessons of Vietnam," and how Afghanistan fails to apply those lessons.

"In Vietnam, American officers trained to fight conventional armies could not adjust to a war where villages welcomed government troops by day and Viet Cong guerrillas by night, where the ARVN troops they fought alongside were not necessarily loyal to their own government, and where the real battlefield lay in the hearts and minds of the people they were supposedly there to defend."

The Big Lie of Counterinsurgency doctrine [COIN] is that the U.S. engages in nasty little wars to win the hearts and minds of people we do not even like. U.S. troops in Vietnam neither liked nor cared about the Vietnamese or their hearts and minds. The name of the game is killing and surviving.

Lesson #1 from Vietnam should be: Think before you act! Ask -- What is the purpose and what is the cost of success, and also, of failure.

"With a surge of 17,000 additional U.S. troops underway in Afghanistan, the Pentagon is making hard choices about how to go about building an Afghan government that has popular legitimacy and can defend itself against Taliban guerrillas."

Using this yardstick, we will never reach a clear and decisive conclusion the the Afghan war. The Pentagon is not expert in building countries; quite the opposite. U.S. Department of Defense assets destroy countries.

Retired NVA Col. Nguyen Huu Nguyen warns, “If the U.S. builds up its forces in Afghanistan it will probably sink deeper into a quagmire,” a statement with which Central Command Chief Gen. David H. Petraeus disagrees. And of course he does, because his next promotion depends upon the hat trick that Afghanistan be pawned off as a success.

Petraeus is described as "one of a cadre of warrior scholars who pushed the U.S. Army to relearn how to fight [COIN]. The new counterinsurgency thinkers included promising younger officers such as Col. H.R. McMaster and Col. John Nagl (now retired)." If LTC Nagl was such a promising young officer, why did the system allow him to fade away? Perhaps because he could not countenance his scholarship being co-opted into a lie?

It was only in 1967, and increasingly after the Tet Offensive in 1968, that the U.S. turned to a strategy of pacification and counterinsurgency, known as “clear and hold.” When it did, it was successful, according to these counterinsurgency reformers. By 1971, the Viet Cong had almost entirely lost its hold on South Vietnam’s countryside. But the U.S. then retreated from Vietnam, and the ARVN was finally outmatched in a main-force struggle against the invading NVA in 1975.

The Republic of Vietnam's Army was never outmatched. It was outfought and out-generaled. The ARVN was fully equipped and trained to defend against NVA operations, but the officers failed to synergistically employ their assets.

Another failure was that former tactics employing vast firepower were no longer available due to U.S. cutbacks in funding and logistics.

The RVN had one of the largest Air Force's in the world, but they failed to employ these assets for anything much besides personal escape vehicles to fly to freedom. the U.S. can clear and hold all day long but in the end, if the indigenous do not fight, then it is all a joke. The Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) is yet another example.

Creating military-type police forces and western-style armies will not ever lead to a successful COIN methodology. The problems of Afghanistan, Iraq and RVN can never be solved by adding more violence to an already violent environment.

Special Forces said in VN, "If you grab them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow." the same is true if you put them in the ground, but this leaves the original question unanswered: Why are we there, anyway?

If combating terrorism is the goal, why do we care about winning their hearts and minds? Just eliminate the threat and drive on. All lessons type articles on COIN focus on the "how" rather than the "why".

However, if the "why" is not legit, then the "how" is an academic exercise in futility.