Dancing in the Dark

Stay on the streets of this town
and they'll be carving you up alright
They say you gotta stay hungry
hey baby I'm just about starving tonight
--Dancing in the Dark, Bruce Springsteen

Look, there is one statement that bothers me
more than anything else, and that's the idea
that when the troops are in combat
everybody has to shut up.
Imagine if we put troops in combat
with a faulty rifle, and that rifle was malfunctioning
and troops were dying as a result.
I can't think anyone would allow that to happen,
that would not speak up.

Well, what's the difference between a faulty plan
and strategy that's getting just as many troops killed?
--General Anthony Zinni (USMC, ret'd, former
CENTCOM Commander in Chief)

You are a fear prisoner.
Yes, you are a product of fear
--Donnie Darko (2001)
_____________________

Recent discussion of Waygul and the Medal of Honor actions in Afghanistan returned the lessons of a distant classroom to mind.

Once upon a time the Army had a doctrine that Captains fight battles, and Colonels and Generals get them there. They also arrange for the ash-and-trash items needed to fulfill the mission. Waygul and Murphy, Miller and Meyer's battles should have been fought by Captains committing their forces to destroy the enemy. All of the units did this to the best of human capacity, but that was not enough. Why?

This led me to ponder the history of the U.S. Civil War (since surely that is what the current wars will devolve into for their own respective peoples). Until Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac was kicked around every battlefield by General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The Union Army was never out-fought or out-soldiered, but they were always out-Generaled, until Gettysburg.

Gettysburg was the first battle in which Union Generals actually generaled their Army and allowed the Captains and enlisted soldiers to fight the enemy on their own terms. The fights in Afghanistan are similar as our soldiers always fight properly, but the Colonels and Generals are not holding up their end.

The soldiers arrive at the battlefield, but they do not get a level playing field because the battlefield is never properly prepared: Items like fire support, medical evacuation, maneuver plans and follow-on forces and reserves are conspicuously missing. Pressure is not maintained on the enemy, and he is allowed to break contact after inflicting predictable casualties upon U.S. soldiers.

The U.S. Army in Afghanistan resembles Lee at Gettysburg without his cavalry screening his Army. Without this screen, Lee had no idea what forces he was facing until he developed the situation, which is what he did, at a disadvantage. U.S. forces in Afghanistan have that same feel of desperately trying to develop the situation, which must be the reason for the lopsided fights that we are seeing.

Meanwhile, what are the Colonels and Generals contributing to the effort? It is strange that the mighty U.S. forces are being out-generaled by folks fighting in shower shoes. This would not make Generals Lee or Meade very happy.

Like Lee at Gettysburg, the U.S. is fighting in the dark.

Knocking on Heaven's Door

--Iain Green, The Scotsman

Old Army joke:

Q: What's the difference between
the Army and the Boy Scouts?
A: The Boy Scouts have adult leadership

The lieutenant's battle was over
His bravery had little impact on the course of the fight.
He could not rescue the men on Topside,
and those who survived would have done so anyway
--Echoes from a Distant Battlefield,
Mark Bowdon

The worst is yet to come
--Arthur Schopenhauer
___________________

Before analyzing the action of latest Medal of Honor recipient, Dakota Meyer, it is important to place it in context of previous Afghanistan engagements. The U.S. has been fighting a war that looks instead like a series of meeting engagements. At its worst, this looks like blind men bumping into each other in the dark.

The brave yet futile actions of Lt. Brostrom in the gunfight at Waygul (503rd) keeps intruding in Ranger's thoughts because it typifies so much of the warfare being conducted over there.

All Afghan MOH scenarios were gunfights like Waygul -- meeting engagements that could have been developed into a real tactical issue, save they lacked an exploitation phase; they had a movement to contact and a contact phase, and then disintegrated. Battles should proceed well beyond this simplicity of action.

The action at Waygul typifies the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) Afghanistan campaigns, characterized as they are by hubris, accompanied by incompetence and tactical and strategic blundering. Though the soldiers fought bravely, their actions take us nowhere.

Military missions follow statements, which outline goals and methodology for success. They serve a larger purpose which is to win more than just the immediate skirmish. But in Afghanistan we have failed to develop most of these situations (engagements) by breaking contact, thereby violating every military rule for success. At least, that is what the recent Medal of Honor citations suggest.

In comparison, in World War II at Iwo Jima there were 27 MOH's in some of the deadliest ground combat U.S. forces have ever experienced. However, every one of these acts of bravery took the U.S. one step closer to victory in the Pacific. In the PWOT ©, we can't even define victory, but that does not stop us from expending our soldier's valor in search of that unquantifiable goal.

Adult leadership, be it from politicians or military leaders, should provide something other than the flimsiest of reasons for fighting, killing and dying based on the John Wayne pretext of "killing bag guys". The soldiers at Waygul and all the other gunfights did what U.S. soldiers always do, they fought as ordered. But where were the adult leaders? Unfortunately, the Army command structure does not ask this question, the answer to which would provide the key to analyzing any action and understanding its success or failure.

The platoon at Waygul was left flapping in the breeze, building a Command Outpost (COP) sans additional support. A platoon whose Company Commander was completing a 15-6 investigation statement rather than addressing the tactical concerns of a unit flung far forward in a dubious tactical environment.

The Commander was covering his ass doing paperwork, and he was doing so with the concurrence of the Battalion Commander. This is the Army. The Company Commander was prioritizing administrative over combat tasks, and therefore could not provide adult leadership. However, the Battalion Commander could have solved the problem by re-assigning the mission to a Company whose Commander was not otherwise occupied with administrative issues. Men die when priorities are skewed.

Key questions from the Wanat battle:

• Why even establish a COP flung forward without proper support? This is a kin to putting cannons on the Titanic to ward off icebergs.

• Did the Brigade Commander, Executive Officer (XO), S-2, S-3 or Command Sergeant Major (CSM) ever walk the terrain or do a map study? Was the feasibility of the venture war-gamed? Where were the adults?

• Ditto Battalion Commander, XO, S-2, S-3 and CSM.
  

• Where was the Company 1st Sergeant?

It is clear that the Platoon was sent on a mission that the Platoon leader was incapable of completing, and his effort was not weighted for success as the iceberg approached. All the adult leaders were elsewhere or otherwise occupied to do more than cast a passing glance at a platoon ground pounding on heaven's door.

If a U.S. Platoon as part of a Company in a Battalion as part of a Brigade in an Airborne unit cannot build a COP, then we must consider seriously what they can do! The same comment applies to the Murphy, Miller and Meyer MOH actions.

All the actions seen in these Afghan campaigns lead one to question the state of training of units and individuals, officers and enlisted men, alike. No amount of valor can trump a lack of technical and tactical expertise. The fights considered here are conspicuously lacking these features.

Waygul, the most discussed small unit action in the Afghan experience, provides a microcosm of the systemic failures eroding an entire Army's ability to fight a nebulous succession of engagements in the no man's land of a tribal society.

The bravery of our soldiers cannot counter these failures.


NEXT: Meeting Engagements

Lang Vei, Revisited

--Paul Longgrear being evacuated to Khe Sanh Airbase,
7 Feb 1968
________________

February 6 was the 42 anniversary of the Battle of Lang Vei fought by members of the 5th Special Forces Group in the Republic of Vietnam.

Ranger's associate Paul Longgrear is the last surviving officer from that battle, but Paul and Ranger have divergent views on the validity of current actions of the U.S. Army. Ranger alone will analogize this action to several from the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ranger emphasizes that nothing he says is a criticism of any Special Forces soldier or their leadership. They fought beyond human comprehension; the Corps and Theatre Commanders are left holding the bag on this one.

The questions I have about Lang Vei are the same I have about Waygul or Wanat or Roberts Ridge, today:

• Was the mission realistic? Achievable?

• Were assets properly allocated to the SF?

• Was Lang Vei key terrain and essential to defend?

• Were Corps assets properly allocated to weight the effort?

These questions haunt the military mind, and are not confined to this lonely and desperate fight for survival. In all of these scenarios, U.S. forces are thrown onto a piece of terrain and told their mission is essential, and that they will attack and secure the locale, or they will defend the terrain, but the rationale for doing so is never clearly thought out.

The soldiers fighting are at the bottom of the food chain. The Corps Commander is the person that bears all responsibility, closely followed by the Theatre Commander. Ranger doubts that the Corps concept even functions in Afghanistan.

The chain of command appears to be Theatre directly down to Platoon Leader, with little thought given to the concept of the operation. To a large extent, Afghanistan resembles the Vietnam War in that too much responsibility is shouldered by Platoon Leaders.

At Lang Vei, the defense was not weighted to achieve the mission. If the defense was important, then adequate Corps artillery assets should have been allocated on a direct support basis, or as general support (GS) or even GS reinforcing. In addition, an Artillery Liaison or Fire Direction Coordinator should have been dedicated to the defensive effort.

Instead, these functions fell to Captain Willoughby, the Camp Commander. They should not have, He should have been leading the camp's defenses, not coordinating supporting defensive fire.

For some inexplicable reason, this was not done.

Ranger was never Mike Force or A Team, but stands in awe of their professionalism and dedication. However, this admiration is always mixed with dismay at the misuse of these assets by Theatre and Corps Commanders and planners. Longgrear's Mike Force was expected to hold terrain that a USMC line battalion would have found difficult to achieve.

These fights devolved to young Lieutenants and Captains. My impression is that all actions above Captain-level were disjointed and reactive in nature. There were no in-place Corps scenarios to reinforce or evacuate Lang Vei in an organized military manner. All reactions above camp level seemed ad hoc.

Lang Vei, Waygul, Wanat and Roberts Ridge share many characteristics. The U.S. engaged forces were given unrealistic and unattainable missions lacking adequate resources. The fights could not be reinforced in a timely manner and the weight of the events fell upon LT's and CPT's. Units were committed piecemeal and placed in positions which the enemy could defeat in detail, with impunity. None were formulas for success.

Lang Vei was a classic battle, and though what we have seen in Afghanistan is not of the same scale, the concept is the same. The unanswered questions pertain to sustainability, reinforcement, reserves, mutual support and weighting the assets of the assigned units emplaced in positions making them vulnerable targets for enemy exploitation.

Then, as now.

Follow-on:

Since writing this piece, Ranger has come across a vital chapter in the book Last Stand at Khe Sanh (2014) by Gregg Jones which expounds upon the Battle for Lang Vei. This book provides a valuable addition to the student of the Lang Vei fight - jh.