O Sole Mio

But she goes not abroad,
in search of monsters to destroy
She is the champion and vindicator
only of her own.
She is the well-wisher to
the freedom and independence of all
--John Quincy Adams

You can't do Right

Wrong,

and you can't do Wrong,

Right!

--seen in American Craft Magazine

(Dec/Jan 2012)

______________________

Terrorism is often called "War on the Cheap", and one must wonder if that is true of the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©), also.

We say the U.S. is the lone Superpower, and that We Support the Troops, but sometimes things aren't as hoped for. In the Waygul battle, and in the three Medal of Honor scenarios (Murphy, Miller and Meyer), the troops received sketchy support -- conduct not meet for the world's sole Superpower.

Waygul (503rd) featured a U.S. Platoon with an inexperienced platoon leader, non-existent engineer support and an inadequate supply of water (Ranger bets the insurgents had adequate water sources). The Platoon could not be reinforced by road or air cover, to include drones -- a dodgy force protection posture, at best. Yet this did not spur anyone in the chain of command to review the mission statement.

The troops soldiered on until nine were Killed in Action and 16 Wounded in Action, causing one to question the logic of utilizing far-flung command outposts that lack proper support, mutual support or adequate logistical support. Is this how Superpowers support their troops in the face of the enemy? Ranger tabs and jump wings will not stop a bullet, contrary to popular belief.

There is a systemic infection across the spectrum of these actions, and this is a weakness in planning and execution. With Lt. Murphy we have three men killed and "one lone survivor", and award a MOH based upon one live witness. The other witnesses were on the other end of a radio link.

Staff Sergeant Miller's MOH was foreshadowed by Lt. Murphy's three years earlier, and was a precursor to Meyer's fight. RangerAgainstWar has discussed each of these engagements per available open-source material, but all leave uncomfortable, unanswered questions.

And the rest of the leading quotation is below. Our esteemed leaders might take some guidance from a not-so-distant luminary in America's intellectual and political arsenal:

She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom.

--John Quincy Adams, On U.S. Foreign Policy (1821)

Goodwill Hunting, II

--Self conqueror wall mural taken by reader
"Enrico" in Thailand

"My good fool," said a learned bystander,

"Your operations are mad."

"You are too candid," cried the candid man,

And when his stick left the head of the learned bystander

It was two sticks

--War is Kind and Other Lines,

Stephen Crane

Action

I got so much to give

I want to give it

I want to get some, too

--I Love the Nightlife,

Alicia Bridges

__________________

Pt. II -- Goodwill Hunting:

So is it any wonder the ostensible goodwill mission turned into a slugfest? The surprise is that the Command did not worst case plan this escapade, and the troops paid the price.

Do we care that the citation was embellished, or that five brave and good Americans died that day for a Goodwill Mission? Is Goodwill Hunting a new mission for a Rifle Platoon or Company? Following are a few rhetorical observations:

McClatchey reports in Dancing Goat II: "The Americans and an Afghan soldier were later found in a trench to which they had retreated." Retreated is not the correct term for what First Lt. Michael E. Johnson, Gunnery Sergeant Edwin W. Johnson, Petty Officer 3rd Class James R. Layton (medic) and Staff Sergeant Aaron M. Kenefick did that day. Retreating indicates an attempt to evacuate the battle area after having cashed it in.

Instead, these men were employing the cover that was available. They were in contact with a superior force and they were falling back under enemy pressure. They did not turn their backs, and this describes their deaths more accurately than calling it a retreat. They died in military order.

Ditto the paper's description of the MOH "winners". The medal of Honor is not won, it is conferred; they are "recipients". The implication of the word winner emanates from a sport culture divided into winners and losers, but the battlefield is not such a game. It could be said that even when one "wins", one has lost on some profound level.

But these are small points. The real point is that we have a President and a USMC Commandant that do not ask the correct questions. Both focus on the actions at the objective to the detriment and exclusion of questions that should be and need to be discussed. Those questions concern command actions which should have been considered before the unit was task organized and launched.

Casting aspersions upon Meyer's actions obscures the fact that good men died needlessly because of poor planning, which leads inevitable to faulty execution. The negative superlatives must fall upon the chain of command to include a Commander in Chief who continues such a senseless war.

The USMC was determined to produce a live MOH recipient and institutionally set out to do so. Controversy resulted, and an MOH recipient who left the Corps as soon as he could put on his hat.

We will close with a comment by then-Lance Cpl. Meyer:

"When somebody calls me a hero, I almost feel sick to my stomach. I'm getting recognized for what I did, but this medal is not about me. It's about the men and women serving right now, and those who will be serving afterward. They're the true heroes" (Man of Honor).

Goodwill Hunting

Nobody does it better
Makes me feel sad for the rest
Nobody does it half as good as you
Baby, you're the best
--Nobody Does it Better,
Carly Simon

99% of us are in the top 1%
--Old quip on Officer Efficiency Reports
___________________

Hyperbole and superlatives have always been the military way.

Everything is "Outstanding" or "Excellent". We speak about "Can do", "Drive on" and "Hooah!" (or, OohRah, for the Marines), and we are surprised that Corporal Meyer's Medal of Honor citation narrative had exaggerations? This is no surprise to anyone who ever wore combat boots or carried a rifle.

Before driving on, let us get straight on Meyer: On his chest he wears a Navy Commendation with "V" device (valor). Like MOH recipient Staff Sergeant Miller before him, who had two Army Commendation medals with "V", Meyer had proven his valor and devotion to duty previous to his MOH encounter. Both men displayed the highest level of valor, and it is not their fault if their citations were inflated.

It is common to "gild the lily" in such reports, knowing that higher HQ's will usually downgrade an award IF it is not properly superlative in nature. This is an institutional bias and independent of the recipients.

With Meyer, as always the questions asked are the wrong ones. We should not question the valor of men like Murphy, Miller and Meyer, but rather ask, "Why were their actions were so desperate?" Why were they thrown into situations that required men to die needlessly for a questionable mission? Soldiers die, but their deaths should have meaning beyond shallow patriotism.

Going on open source material (sans Operations Order [OPORD] or After-Action Report [AAR]), the planned action is too sordid and questionable even before the first round is fired. The questions devolve to questions about the command responsibility of higher Headquarters.

McClatchey describes Meyer's action as a "savage gunfight in East Afghanistan" (14 Dec 11); in Meyer's Maxim interview (12 Dec 11), "Meyers and Chavez provide security at the Objective Rally Point (ORP) while the members . . . enter the Ganjgal village on foot."

Since this was an assigned mission and had an Objective Rally Point (ORP), we know that the team was executing an approach march to make contact, or to enter the village. We also know or trust that the team knew there would be contact at some level of engagement. It is safe to assume that their movement to contact was not an Easter egg hunt, and that they utilized appropriate Infantry tactics.

These tactics include point element, dispersion, over-watch, cover and concealment (as possible), team integrity and patrol HQ controlling the movement. This could not be an ambush -- as some have indicated -- because the unit knew that they were in a danger zone before the shooting began.

If you accept this, than what follows must be true based upon 220 years of U.S. Army patrolling skills which have translated into accepted Infantry rules and practice. There are no news flashes here; Rogers' Rules for Rangers outlined conduct for such situations, as did Carlson's Raiders of World War II USMC fame. Contrary to the line we are fed that fighting in Afghanistan and the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) is a new form of warfare, there is nothing new under the sun.

All actions are like an old M1 rifle and composed of three parts: The Front, The Middle and The Back. When pre-planning a mission we use backward planning steps and follow standard troop leading procedure. All of these actions should be in the OPORD and are SOP in most units. Here is the breakdown:

Front: Actions before mission
Middle: Actions during mission
Back: Actions after mission

Actions before include command responsibility for:

• Arranging fire support
• Weighting the action for success
• Medical and communication
• Actions of Adjacent or friendly units in supporting distance
• Quick Reaction Force (QRF) considerations
• Beans and Bullets (=all logistical functions)
• Air assets
• Photo and satellite imagery
• Agent reports
• Enemy order of battle. What should the patrol expect during the execution phase? What should the soldiers expect to await them?

Instead, failure occurred on several accounts. From the reports,

• Fire support was non-responsive and not pre-planned. Fire planning is not something done "on the fly". It is too late to pre-plan after decisive engagement; it is an oxymoron.
  

• Gunships were not pre-planned. Guns and fire support were an afterthought.

• Medical support was sketchy. Only one medic can be identified, and he was Killed in Action. Where is the best place to situate the medic -- with the assault element or at the ORP? Were the team members certified as Combat Lifesavers and if so, how could they perform this function if they were operating their rifles and required to fight for the life of the team?

• Was there a readily available escape route? Since the ORP was identified, why was there no provision for the team to fall back and assemble on the ORP? This, after all, is the function of this location.

• Did the U.S. troops, the Marines and the Afghan National Army (ANA) members have any operational planning or training operating as a joint force prior to this mission?
  

• What was the mission? What was this team to accomplish with the assets at hand? Was it realistic?

McClatchey states that the action "began as a goodwill mission by Afghan troops and American trainers", yet conspicuously absent were any civilian Afghan representatives. Further, how can a force of "About 20 Marines, 50 Army troops, 70 ANA soldiers and border police" possible be construed as a "goodwill mission"?

Imagine yourself an Afghan in a remote valley and 140 heavily-armed and dangerous men are approaching your village. Googling "Goodwill" will not fetch this image.


Tomorrow: Pt II, Goodwill Hunting

Dancing in the Dark

Stay on the streets of this town
and they'll be carving you up alright
They say you gotta stay hungry
hey baby I'm just about starving tonight
--Dancing in the Dark, Bruce Springsteen

Look, there is one statement that bothers me
more than anything else, and that's the idea
that when the troops are in combat
everybody has to shut up.
Imagine if we put troops in combat
with a faulty rifle, and that rifle was malfunctioning
and troops were dying as a result.
I can't think anyone would allow that to happen,
that would not speak up.

Well, what's the difference between a faulty plan
and strategy that's getting just as many troops killed?
--General Anthony Zinni (USMC, ret'd, former
CENTCOM Commander in Chief)

You are a fear prisoner.
Yes, you are a product of fear
--Donnie Darko (2001)
_____________________

Recent discussion of Waygul and the Medal of Honor actions in Afghanistan returned the lessons of a distant classroom to mind.

Once upon a time the Army had a doctrine that Captains fight battles, and Colonels and Generals get them there. They also arrange for the ash-and-trash items needed to fulfill the mission. Waygul and Murphy, Miller and Meyer's battles should have been fought by Captains committing their forces to destroy the enemy. All of the units did this to the best of human capacity, but that was not enough. Why?

This led me to ponder the history of the U.S. Civil War (since surely that is what the current wars will devolve into for their own respective peoples). Until Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac was kicked around every battlefield by General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The Union Army was never out-fought or out-soldiered, but they were always out-Generaled, until Gettysburg.

Gettysburg was the first battle in which Union Generals actually generaled their Army and allowed the Captains and enlisted soldiers to fight the enemy on their own terms. The fights in Afghanistan are similar as our soldiers always fight properly, but the Colonels and Generals are not holding up their end.

The soldiers arrive at the battlefield, but they do not get a level playing field because the battlefield is never properly prepared: Items like fire support, medical evacuation, maneuver plans and follow-on forces and reserves are conspicuously missing. Pressure is not maintained on the enemy, and he is allowed to break contact after inflicting predictable casualties upon U.S. soldiers.

The U.S. Army in Afghanistan resembles Lee at Gettysburg without his cavalry screening his Army. Without this screen, Lee had no idea what forces he was facing until he developed the situation, which is what he did, at a disadvantage. U.S. forces in Afghanistan have that same feel of desperately trying to develop the situation, which must be the reason for the lopsided fights that we are seeing.

Meanwhile, what are the Colonels and Generals contributing to the effort? It is strange that the mighty U.S. forces are being out-generaled by folks fighting in shower shoes. This would not make Generals Lee or Meade very happy.

Like Lee at Gettysburg, the U.S. is fighting in the dark.

Knocking on Heaven's Door

--Iain Green, The Scotsman

Old Army joke:

Q: What's the difference between
the Army and the Boy Scouts?
A: The Boy Scouts have adult leadership

The lieutenant's battle was over
His bravery had little impact on the course of the fight.
He could not rescue the men on Topside,
and those who survived would have done so anyway
--Echoes from a Distant Battlefield,
Mark Bowdon

The worst is yet to come
--Arthur Schopenhauer
___________________

Before analyzing the action of latest Medal of Honor recipient, Dakota Meyer, it is important to place it in context of previous Afghanistan engagements. The U.S. has been fighting a war that looks instead like a series of meeting engagements. At its worst, this looks like blind men bumping into each other in the dark.

The brave yet futile actions of Lt. Brostrom in the gunfight at Waygul (503rd) keeps intruding in Ranger's thoughts because it typifies so much of the warfare being conducted over there.

All Afghan MOH scenarios were gunfights like Waygul -- meeting engagements that could have been developed into a real tactical issue, save they lacked an exploitation phase; they had a movement to contact and a contact phase, and then disintegrated. Battles should proceed well beyond this simplicity of action.

The action at Waygul typifies the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) Afghanistan campaigns, characterized as they are by hubris, accompanied by incompetence and tactical and strategic blundering. Though the soldiers fought bravely, their actions take us nowhere.

Military missions follow statements, which outline goals and methodology for success. They serve a larger purpose which is to win more than just the immediate skirmish. But in Afghanistan we have failed to develop most of these situations (engagements) by breaking contact, thereby violating every military rule for success. At least, that is what the recent Medal of Honor citations suggest.

In comparison, in World War II at Iwo Jima there were 27 MOH's in some of the deadliest ground combat U.S. forces have ever experienced. However, every one of these acts of bravery took the U.S. one step closer to victory in the Pacific. In the PWOT ©, we can't even define victory, but that does not stop us from expending our soldier's valor in search of that unquantifiable goal.

Adult leadership, be it from politicians or military leaders, should provide something other than the flimsiest of reasons for fighting, killing and dying based on the John Wayne pretext of "killing bag guys". The soldiers at Waygul and all the other gunfights did what U.S. soldiers always do, they fought as ordered. But where were the adult leaders? Unfortunately, the Army command structure does not ask this question, the answer to which would provide the key to analyzing any action and understanding its success or failure.

The platoon at Waygul was left flapping in the breeze, building a Command Outpost (COP) sans additional support. A platoon whose Company Commander was completing a 15-6 investigation statement rather than addressing the tactical concerns of a unit flung far forward in a dubious tactical environment.

The Commander was covering his ass doing paperwork, and he was doing so with the concurrence of the Battalion Commander. This is the Army. The Company Commander was prioritizing administrative over combat tasks, and therefore could not provide adult leadership. However, the Battalion Commander could have solved the problem by re-assigning the mission to a Company whose Commander was not otherwise occupied with administrative issues. Men die when priorities are skewed.

Key questions from the Wanat battle:

• Why even establish a COP flung forward without proper support? This is a kin to putting cannons on the Titanic to ward off icebergs.

• Did the Brigade Commander, Executive Officer (XO), S-2, S-3 or Command Sergeant Major (CSM) ever walk the terrain or do a map study? Was the feasibility of the venture war-gamed? Where were the adults?

• Ditto Battalion Commander, XO, S-2, S-3 and CSM.
  

• Where was the Company 1st Sergeant?

It is clear that the Platoon was sent on a mission that the Platoon leader was incapable of completing, and his effort was not weighted for success as the iceberg approached. All the adult leaders were elsewhere or otherwise occupied to do more than cast a passing glance at a platoon ground pounding on heaven's door.

If a U.S. Platoon as part of a Company in a Battalion as part of a Brigade in an Airborne unit cannot build a COP, then we must consider seriously what they can do! The same comment applies to the Murphy, Miller and Meyer MOH actions.

All the actions seen in these Afghan campaigns lead one to question the state of training of units and individuals, officers and enlisted men, alike. No amount of valor can trump a lack of technical and tactical expertise. The fights considered here are conspicuously lacking these features.

Waygul, the most discussed small unit action in the Afghan experience, provides a microcosm of the systemic failures eroding an entire Army's ability to fight a nebulous succession of engagements in the no man's land of a tribal society.

The bravery of our soldiers cannot counter these failures.


NEXT: Meeting Engagements

Afghanistan Medals of Honor

If this is what being a hero feels like,
you can have it
--Cpl. Dakota Meyer, Medal of Honor recipient
_____________________

The Murphy, Meyer and Miller Medals of Honor all share certain hallmarks:

• The enemy was overwhelming

• There were no Quick Reaction Forces (QRF's) ready to launch

• The hostile fighters had intimate knowledge of the battle space and had prepared the battlefield. The U.S. troops were behind the power curve before the first round went downrange.

• The concept of Cover, Concealment, Key Terrain and Avenues of Approach were ignored.

• Escape routes were non-existent

• Fire support was questionable

• Medical support was negligible

• Witness statements appeared self-serving and conflicting

• The pace of the fights were dictated by the hostile forces and they maintained the initiative throughout

• If the missions had been successful, what would the exploitation phase have looked like? None appeared evident

These are some basic observations. Ranger stands behind his original battle analyses [links HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE.] (Per previous Afghan War MOH recipients, SFC Paul Smith's MOH was awarded in a correct action; SSG, Salvatore Giunta's MOH did not meet the bar in a sane world in Ranger's opinion, and should have been a Silver Star, instead.)

Since the Unit Commander established an Objective Rally Point (ORP), this indicates Meyer's action was a planned attack or raid. (This was not a meeting engagement -- a combat action that occurs when a moving force, not necessarily deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place -- as the hostiles were expected to be on-target.)

An ORP is the last covered and concealed, easily identified terrain feature out of the range of enemy direct fire weapons. The ORP is where the assault element moves out to the line of departure, which is the kick-off point of the attack.

Though this was a planned attack and not a meeting engagement (as both sides were arrayed to fight) it was conducted by the U.S. as if it were not planned. No follow-on forces were available for employment once the enemy was fixed and engaged.

A deliberate attack, such as this one, differs from a hasty attack in that the attackers (U.S.) should have thoroughly prepared the battlespace, to include photo and satellite imagery and agent reports. Active patrolling is usually part of the preparations.

Planned or hasty attacks and meeting engagements are anticipated and are expected to further the Commander's scheme of maneuver. The unit should always be prepared to continue on order, or to be relieved by an element that will exploit any initial success. From materials available, it appears that all U.S. fights look a lot like meeting engagements; this is bad on many levels, but especially because it denies the U.S. elements their combat multipliers.

There was no indirect fire available to seal off enemy avenues of approach and to deny them assembly areas or to block their escape routes. This appears to have been one-sided slugfest weighted to the enemy's advantage.

MOH recipient Meyers was featured in the Dec. Maxim magazine (which hired him in September as their Military consultant), however, the following soldier's questions remain unanswered in that interview:

• What was the mission?

• Why did the attackers channelize and attack a larger, dug-in force without artillery or air support?

• Where was the assault elements reserve force?

• Why was the ORP not secured more solidly?

• Did the divergent assault elements have a habitual relationship, or was it an ad hoc, slap-dash pickup team?

• Why did the unit lack organic mortars?

• Why were there no registered artillery concentrations?

• The state of training for the Afghan Nation Army members (ANA's) was deficient per Meyer. Why would any unit employ questionable combat assets?

• Why were there last minute additions to and deletions from the team?

• What was the medical evac policy and SOP for this unit?

• [On Iwo Jim, the Marines would do a deliberate assault on fortified caves with two medical corpsmen per platoon, and this was still insufficient. Also at Iwo, there was a company and battalion aid station somewhere immediately to the rear to assist in medical evacuation and treatment. In Cpl. Meyer's action, there appears to be only one corpsman and he was killed forward.]
  

This is a condemnation of the staff planning and indicates a weakness in the overall troop leading procedures. Did the commander employ backward planning steps? It looks doubtful. Communication from higher to low and low-to-high appears spotty. At best, there was a commo link that did not provide appropriate fire support.

This was a down-and-dirty analysis. The next entry will address the details of the action.

The Medal of Honor and The Messenger

Send lawyers, guns and money
The shit has hit the fan
--Lawyers, Guns and Money, Warren Zevon

Studies and Observations Group (SOG) joke:

I was recommended for the Medal of Honor

but it was downgraded to a letter of reprimand

____________________

Suggestions of inconsistencies in the citation of the most recent Medal of Honor recipient, Dakota Meyer, is in line with Ranger's thinking on most of the recent MOH awards (Marines promoted inflated story for Medal of Honor recipient).

McClatchey News reports, "[C]rucial parts that the Marine Corps publicized and Obama described are untrue, unsubstantiated or exaggerated." Before this allegation, RangerAgainstWar had suggested that the Murphy, Miller and Guinta's citations shared the same problems, as well. This overview was written before reading the source article, because he does not want that writer's views to affect his thinking. (After surveying the materials, he will write a detailed abstract.)

Some recent history on military commendations is in order. Ranger has been where Medals of Honor used to grow on trees when he was assigned to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in 1970-71 in the Vietnam War. When Bennie Adkins was nominated for his deserved MOH in the late 1960's, General Westmoreland went on record to ask the 5th Group Commander if they were "running a Medal of Honor factory"; Bennie did not get his medal.

The awarding of the Medal of Honor -- the military's highest valor award -- has often been contentious. Army SF scuttlebutt Vietnam era was that Captain Donlon received his MOH because President Johnson wanted to ramp up support for the war; Captain Carpenter's MOH was rescinded because the facts did not corroborate with the citation. General MacArthur and General Wainwright received what could be described as political awards of the coveted honor (in 1941 and '45).

Ranger contends that the Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©) MOH winners have exhibited conspicuous tactical bravery that did not translate out to anything of military value for anybody concerned. Fighting and killing with no larger purpose is butchery, not soldiering. The purpose of combat is to achieve tactical success to influence the strategic goals of a Commander. Or, battles are fought to achieve a decisive conclusion to an otherwise dull brawl. While this should be the case, in actual execution it is not always achieved.

In the Civil War, General Lee produced brilliant tactical victories (at Seven Pines, Antietam, Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg), but he never exploited his successes to achieve strategic dominance. All the killing was simply a butcher's bill. Likewise, General Meade did not exploit his success at Gettysburg, hence it was much motion with little strategic progress. Unexploited victories are wasted motion.

When Medals of Honor are awarded simply for killing and tactical prowess sans further benefit, they are meaningless, like the above cited battles which were also filled with overwhelming examples of conspicuous gallantry.

Back to 5th Group in Vietnam, and specifically the MOH's awarded to the classified Studies and Observations Group (SOG). The SOG MOH's differ from Murphy's, Miller's, Meyer's and Guinta's in this way: They were all awarded for strategic reconnaissance and/or exploitation of strategic intelligence gathered by the teams. The death and killing served a larger strategic purpose.

Whenever a SOG reconnaissance team was shot out of an Area of Operation, these were always bloody meeting engagements. When our exploitation or hatchet forces would go in to exploit the meeting engagement or the intel derived therefrom, this would then be a planned attack. The ensuing violence had a military purpose.

The mentioned MOH's awarded in Afghanistan lack any purpose beyond the immediate slugfest. The violence served no larger purpose, and violence without purpose is not a military concept.

____________________

NEXT: Commonalities in the Afghanistan Medals of Honor citations